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679 
MONTGOMERY V. LOUISIANA: AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE 




In 2012, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case Miller 
v. Alabama,1 which held that mandatory life in prison without parole 
for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment,2 even in homicide cas-
es.3  After the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller, courts across the 
country were left to decide if this ruling applied retroactively to all 
prisoners facing a mandatory life sentence for a homicide committed 
as a juvenile.4  Notably, the highest courts in Louisiana, Michigan, 
Pennsylvania, and Minnesota held Miller is procedural and, therefore, 
should not be applied retroactively.5  However, nine states held the 
rule from Miller is substantive and therefore does apply retroactive-
ly.6 
As a result of the split among the states, the Supreme Court 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2017, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; M.A., John Jay Col-
lege of Criminal Justice, 2011; B.A., University of Delaware, 2009.  I would like to thank 
Professor Gary Shaw for his advice and support, and my Touro Law Review Notes & Com-
ments Editor Kristen Curley for her time, assistance, and unwavering confidence in me.  Fi-
nally, I would like to thank my family for their constant support and encouragement 
throughout law school. 
1 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
3 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. 
4 Perry L. Moriearty, Miller v. Alabama and the Retroactivity of Proportionality Rules, 17 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 929, 967, 968 (2015). 
5 Id. at 968, 971. 
6 Id. at 968 (explaining Mississippi, Nebraska, South Carolina, Iowa, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Illinois, Wyoming, and Texas have all held Miller is retroactive). 
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granted certiorari in Montgomery v. Louisiana7 in order to decide 
whether Miller should be applied retroactively.8  The Supreme Court 
announced its decision on January 25, 2016, holding the new rule 
from Miller is substantive and, therefore, is not subject to the general 
bar on retroactivity for cases on collateral review.9 
Over 2,000 people currently serving a mandatory sentence of 
life in prison without parole for a homicide committed before they 
were 18 years old will be affected by this decision. 10  Several states 
have hundreds of prisoners that now must be resentenced.11  For in-
stance, Pennsylvania alone has 482 prisoners.12  Even more, many of 
these cases were sentenced decades ago, with some even dating back 
as far as the 1950s.13  Resentencing hundreds of inmates will prove to 
be problematic for many of these states because the facts needed for a 
discretionary sentencing hearing were not recorded at the time of the 
initial sentencing.14 
The Supreme Court acknowledged this issue in its decision 
and explained that states do not need to resentence everyone, but 
could consider these inmates for parole instead; however, the states 
 
7 135 S. Ct. 1546 (2015). 
8 Montgomery v. Louisiana Question Presented, http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/14-
00280qp.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2015).  This is the second time the Supreme Court has 
granted certiorari to decide this particular issue.  In 2014, the Court granted certiorari in To-
ca v. Louisiana; however, the case was dismissed when the defendant was released early 
from prison after receiving a new plea deal. 141 So. 3d 265 (L.A. 2014), cert. granted in 
part, 135 S. Ct. 781 (2014) and cert. dismissed, 135 S. Ct. 1197 (2015); Lyle Denniston, Ju-
venile Sentencing Argument Expanded, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 14, 2015, 3:11 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/09/juvenile-sentencing-argument-expanded/ [hereinafter 
Denniston, Argument Expanded]. 
9 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 718, 732 (2016). 
10 Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, 38, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) 
(No. 14-280) [hereinafter Transcript]; Brief of Amici Curiae State of Michigan and 15 Other 
States in Support of the Respondent at 12, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) 
(No. 14-280) [hereinafter Brief of Other States]; Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Considers 
Reprieve for Kids who Kill, USA Today (Oct. 11, 2015 9:48 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/10/11/supreme-court-juvenile-life-
without-parole-murder/73594976/. 
11 Brief of Other States, supra note 10, at 13-15. 
12 Brief of Other States, supra note 10, at 13.  Additionally, Michigan has 368 prisoners 
and Louisiana has 202 prisoners who must be resentenced. Id. at 14-15. 
13 Brief of Other States, supra note 10, at 4, 13-15; Wolf, supra note 10.  In fact, Pennsyl-
vania has an inmate who was sentenced to life in prison without parole following a 1956 
murder. Brief of Other States, supra note 10, at 13.  In Louisiana, one inmate who was sen-
tenced to life in prison without parole committed murder in 1958. Id. at 15. 
14 Brief of Other States, supra note 10, at 9. 
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must address the sentence to ensure the prisoner is not serving a dis-
proportionate sentence.15  Despite the imposition on the states, the 
Court made clear that “[t]here is no grandfather clause that permits 
States to enforce punishments the Constitution forbids.”16  Therefore, 
a sentence is void even if the sentence was finalized before the Su-
preme Court held the specific type of sentence was unconstitutional.17 
Overall, the Court made the correct decision in Montgomery; 
however, the Court was intellectually dishonest in its analysis.  In its 
opinion, the majority found Miller to be retroactive by rewriting the 
holding.18  Even worse, the Court could have come to the same con-
clusion without conducting an intellectually dishonest analysis.  The 
Court was swayed by its dislike for juvenile life without parole sen-
tences and the majority tried to make the sentence difficult to impose.  
This comment asserts the majority had a specific outcome it wanted 
to reach and tailored its opinion in order to reach that holding. 
This comment will explore the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Montgomery.  Section II will explore the Court’s decision in Miller.  
Section III will analyze the doctrine for applying a new rule retroac-
tively as set forth in Teague v. Lane.19  Section IV will analyze the 
Court’s decision in Montgomery and the accusations raised by the 
dissent.  Finally, Section V will show how the majority was intellec-
tually dishonest and how it was actively trying to make juvenile life 
without parole practically impossible. 
II. MANDATORY LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR 
JUVENILES IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
The Court in Miller, by a 5-4 decision, banned mandatory life 
in prison without parole for any juvenile offense.20  This decision by 
the Supreme Court invalidated the sentencing schemes in the majori-
ty of the states and even the federal government.21 
 
15 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736. 
16 Id. at 731. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 743 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
19 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
20 Sara L. Ochs, Miller v. Alabama: The Supreme Court's Lenient Approach to Our Na-
tion's Juvenile Murderers, 58 LOY. L. REV. 1073, 1073 (2012).  . 
21 Id. at 1074.  Twenty-nine jurisdictions allowed for mandatory life without parole for 
juveniles at the time. Ioana Tchoukleva, Children Are Different: Bridging the Gap Between 
3
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Miller and its companion case, Jackson v. Hobbs,22 each in-
volved a 14 year old who was sentenced to life in prison without pa-
role following a murder conviction.23  In Arkansas, Kuntrell Jackson 
was charged as an adult for felony murder after a co-defendant shot 
and killed a store clerk while three boys attempted to rob the store.24  
Jackson discovered his co-defendant had the shotgun on the way to 
the store, and while he initially decided to stay outside, he did go into 
the store while the robbery was in progress.25  There was a dispute as 
to whether Jackson actually knew the other boys were planning to rob 
the store at gunpoint and actively took part or thought the boys were 
joking.26 
In Alabama, Evan Miller was charged as an adult, convicted 
of murder, and mandatorily sentenced to life without parole.27  One 
night, after smoking marijuana and drinking with a friend and a 
neighbor, Miller tried to steal money from the neighbor’s wallet after 
he passed out.28  The neighbor woke up and an altercation ensued.29  
In the end, Miller hit the neighbor repeatedly with a baseball bat.30  
Miller then covered the neighbor with a sheet, said, “I am God, I’ve 
come to take your life,” and then hit him one more time.31  Miller and 
his friend eventually set fire to the trailer to destroy any evidence of 
the crime; the neighbor died from smoke inhalation.32  Following a 
mandatory sentence to life in prison without parole, both Miller and 
Jackson argued their sentences violated the Eighth Amendment of the 
Constitution based on the reasoning in Roper v. Simmons33 and Gra-
ham v. Florida.34 
 
Rhetoric and Reality Post Miller v. Alabama, 4 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 92, 97 (2013). 
22 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
23 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461-63. 
24 Id. at 2461. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 2462-63. 





33 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding the death penalty for anyone under the age of 18 years old 
violates the Eighth Amendment). 
34 560 U.S. 48 (2011) (holding juvenile life in prison without parole for a non-homicide 
offense is unconstitutional); Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461, 2463. 
4
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The Court looked at the Eighth Amendment, which states, 
“excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”35  In its interpretation 
the Court explained that the “prohibition of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment ‘guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to exces-
sive sanctions.’ ”36  The Court explained that a punishment must be 
proportional to the defendant and the crime because “proportionality 
is central to the Eighth Amendment.”37  Further, proportionality is 
examined by “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress 
of a maturing society.”38 
Alabama and Arkansas opposed the imposition of individual-
ized sentencing for juveniles facing life without parole.39  First, the 
States argued the new rule established by the majority conflicted with 
Eighth Amendment case precedent.40  In Harmelin v. Michigan,41 the 
Court had upheld a mandatory life without parole sentence.  The 
Court explained “that a sentence which is not otherwise cruel and un-
usual” does not “become so simply because it is ‘mandatory.’ ”42  
The States argued prohibiting mandatory life in prison without parole 
overrules Harmelin.43  However, Harmelin itself did not involve a ju-
venile nor did the opinion claim to apply to juvenile offenders.44  It is 
well established that appropriate sentences for adults may be uncon-
stitutional for juveniles.45  Therefore, the ruling in Miller did not 
overrule Harmelin.46 
Justice Kagan, who wrote the majority opinion, wove two 
strings of precedent together in order to conclude mandatory life 
without parole was unconstitutional.47  Specifically, the Court con-
sidered Roper and Graham, which both categorically banned a pun-
 
35 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463. 
36 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463 (quoting Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1190). 
37 Id. (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021). 
38 Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 S. Ct. 285, 290 (1976)). 
39 Id. at 2469-70. 
40 Id. at 2470. 
41 501 U.S. 959 (1991). 
42 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. (explaining Roper prohibits the death penalty for juveniles and Graham prohibits 
life without parole for non-homicide offenses for juveniles). 
46 Id. 
47 Tchoukleva, supra note 21, at 96. 
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ishment for juveniles, and Woodson v. North Carolina48 and Lockett 
v. Ohio,49 which held a defendant’s characteristics must be consid-
ered before the death penalty can be imposed.50 
The Court relied heavily on its reasoning in Roper and Gra-
ham, in which it explained that juveniles are different from adults for 
sentencing purposes.51  Juveniles tend to be more immature, reckless, 
irresponsible, and vulnerable to peer pressure than adults.52  They al-
so have little control over their surroundings and do not have the ca-
pacity to extricate themselves from dangerous situations.53  The Court 
stated that these traits found in juveniles “diminish the penological 
justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offend-
ers.”54  Juveniles have the best chance of rehabilitation; however, the 
penological justifications for rehabilitation are not served by a sen-
tence of life without parole.55  The differences between juveniles and 
adults make them “less deserving of the most severe punishments.”56 
Even though the Court in Graham limited its holding to non-
homicide offenders, juvenile traits that lead to crime are not crime-
specific.57  In fact, juvenile traits are just as relevant in a robbery that 
results in felony murder as they are in a regular robbery.58  The traits 
that distinguish juveniles from adults are universal to all juvenile of-
fenders for all crime categories.59  Even more, traits attributed to 
youth weaken the justifications for punishment, which in turn may 
cause a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile to be dispropor-
tionate to his or her crime and status.60 
The Court in Miller explained that removing age as a factor 
 
48 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
49 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
50 Tchoukleva, supra note 21, at 96. 
51 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 
52 Id.; Mariko K. Shitama, Bringing Our Children Back from the Land of Nod: Why the 
Eighth Amendment Forbids Condemning Juveniles to Die in Prison for Accessorial Felony 
Murder, 65 FLA. L. REV. 813, 836 (2013). 
53 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464; Shitama, supra note 52, at 836. 
54 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 (explaining that juvenile life without parole does not satisfy 
the theories of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation). 
55 Id. at 2464-65. 
56 Id. at 2464 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 68). 
57 Id. at 2465. 
58 Id. 
59 Ochs, supra note 20, at 1083. 
60 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465-66. 
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from such severe sentencing procedures “poses too great a risk [a] 
disproportionate punishment” will be imposed.61  Age is an important 
feature in any Eighth Amendment analysis, especially when consider-
ing the proportionality of a sentence.62  It is well established that ju-
veniles are less culpable than adults, and the age of a juvenile offend-
er can play a pivotal role in an Eighth Amendment proportionality 
analysis.63 
Next, Alabama and Arkansas argued a mandatory sentencing 
scheme was constitutional because there were many states with simi-
lar mandatory schemes in place.64  At the time, there were 29 juris-
dictions that had mandatory life without parole schemes for juve-
niles.65  When considering categorical bars, the Court does consider 
whether there is a “ ‘national consensus’ against a sentence for a par-
ticular class of offenders.”66  However, the Court distinguished the 
Miller case from this line of precedent,67 stating, 
[o]ur decision does not categorically bar a penalty for 
a class of offenders or type of crime—as, for example 
we did in Roper or Graham.  Instead, it mandates only 
that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering 
an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—
before imposing a particular penalty.68 
In fact, in Graham, the Court barred juvenile life in prison without 
parole for non-homicide cases, despite the fact that 39 jurisdictions 
allowed for it.69  Also, in several death penalty cases, the Court 
deemed the death penalty unconstitutional for certain classes of peo-
ple, despite the fact that only a minority of states had chosen to enact 
similar statutes.70  Therefore, a “national consensus” does not pre-
 
61 Id. at 2469. 
62 Id. at 2466 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 77). 
63 Id. (discussing Graham, 560 U.S. at 90 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment)); see 
supra text accompanying notes 51-60. 
64 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470. 
65 Id. at 2471. 
66 Id. at 2470. 
67 Id. at 2471. 
68 Id. 
69 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471. 
70 Id. at 2472.  In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court vacated a death penalty sentence for a 
15 year old in its plurality opinion, even though only 18 states had a minimum age require-
ment for the death penalty, all of which had a minimum of 16 years old. 487 U.S. 815, 819, 
7
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clude the Court’s holding that mandatory life in prison schemes for 
juveniles are unconstitutional.71 
Additionally, mandatory death penalty sentences are unconsti-
tutional because they exclude individual characteristics from being 
considered.72  By assessing the mitigating factors, only the most cul-
pable will receive the death penalty.73  Mandatory life without parole 
for juveniles excludes a sentencing body from considering mitigating 
factors, such as age and other traits that accompany age.74  The Court 
further explained, “[j]ust as the chronological age of a minor is itself 
a relevant mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background 
and mental and emotional development of a youthful defendant be 
duly considered.”75  Mandatory schemes even ignore a juvenile’s ac-
tual participation in the offense.76  Even more, mandatory schemes 
ignore the possibility that a juvenile can be rehabilitated.77  This is 
especially important because the “hallmark features” of childhood are 
transient.78  Mandatory schemes inherently violate the basic principle 
set forth in Graham and Roper, “that imposition of a State’s most se-
vere penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they 
were not children.”79 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that mandatory life in 
prison without parole is unconstitutional for juveniles because it vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punish-
ment.”80  Notably, life in prison without parole for juveniles is still 
 
829, 838 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality).  In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court held the death penal-
ty was unconstitutional for the mentally disabled, even though less than half of the states that 
allowed for the death penalty had a mentally disabled exception. 536 U.S. 304, 321, 342 
(2002) (Stevens, J., opinion) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).  In Roper, the Court held the death 
penalty was unconstitutional for juveniles, even though only 18 out of the 38 states that al-
lowed for the death penalty had a prohibition for minors. 543 U.S. at 578, 595 (2005) (Ken-
nedy, J., opinion) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
71 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2472 n.11. 
72 Id. at 2467. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 2468 (explaining a juvenile may have a dysfunctional home life that he or she 
cannot remove oneself from due to his or her age). 
75 Id. at 2467 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869, 877 (1982)). 
76 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 2467.  The “hallmark features” of age include, “immaturity, impetuosity, and fail-
ure to appreciate risks and consequences.” Id. at 2468. 
79 Id. at 2458. 
80 Miller, 132 S. Ct.at 2460. 
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constitutional81 and can still be imposed; only now, sentencing bodies 
must consider factors that make juveniles different from adults.82  
Even though the sentence is still constitutional, the Court did specify 
that life without parole for juveniles should be uncommon.83  This is 
due to the fact that it is difficult to distinguish a juvenile with a tran-
sient immaturity from one with an irreparable corruption.84 
III. THE RULE FOR RETROACTIVE APPLICATION 
The legal principle for when to apply a new rule retroactively 
was established by a plurality decision in Teague.85  In this plurality 
opinion, Justice O’Connor adopted Justice Harlan’s theory on retro-
activity from Mackey v. United States.86  The rule for retroactivity 
was later adopted and expanded by subsequent cases, including Penry 
v. Lynaugh.87 
The plurality in Teague stated that all new rules, either sub-
stantive or procedural, must be applied retroactively when a case is 
on direct review.88  In contrast, new criminal procedure rules are gen-
 
81 Id. at 2469. 
82 Id. 
83 Id.; Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: A New Look – Maybe – at Life Sentences for 
Youths, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 9, 2015, 12:22 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/10/a-
new-look-maybe-at-life-sentences-for-youths/ [hereinafter Denniston, Argument Preview]. 
84 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
85 Teague, 489 U.S. 288; Brief for Petitioner at 13, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 
718 (2016) (No. 14-280) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].  However, Teague was a federal 
collateral review case. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728. 
86 Teague, 489 U.S. at 310 (O’Connor, J., plurality); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 
667 (1971) (Harlan, J., opinion concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part). 
87 492 U.S. 302, 314 (1989) (abrogated on other grounds by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 
(extending Teague to capital sentencing cases)); Benjamin P. Cooper, Truth in Sentencing: 
The Prospective and Retroactive Application of Simmons v. South Carolina, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1573, 1588 (1996); See also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 
494 U.S. 484 (1990); Butler v. Mckellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); Christopher N. Lasch, The 
Future of Teague Retroactivity, or “Redressability,” After Danforth v. Minnesota: Why 
Lower Courts Should Give Retroactive Effect to New Constitutional Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 25 (2009). 
88 Teague, 489 U.S. at 303, 319 (O’Connor, J., plurality, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, 
J., and Kennedy, J.  In a concurring opinion Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J. in part, 
agreed new rules should be applied retroactively on direct review).  “[A] case announces a 
new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal 
Government.” Id. at 301.  A new rule has also been defined as “not dictated by precedent 
existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Id. 
9
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erally not applied retroactively on collateral review.89  This general 
bar on collateral retroactivity is due to the fact that a case that follows 
the procedures and rules that are constitutional at the time of the deci-
sion will generally be found to be fundamentally fair.90  The principle 
of finality is fundamental to the criminal justice system and applying 
constitutional rules retroactively undermines this principle.91  How-
ever, the plurality clarified that “in some situations it might be that 
time and growth in social capacity, as well as judicial perceptions of 
what we can rightly demand of the adjudicatory process, will proper-
ly alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that 
must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction.”92 
There are two exceptions for when a new rule should be ap-
plied retroactively on collateral review: 1) “if it places ‘certain kinds 
of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the crim-
inal law-making authority to proscribe’ ” and 2) “if it requires the ob-
servance of ‘those procedures that . . . are implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.’ ”93  The first exception has evolved to distinguish 
substantive rules from procedural rules.94  In fact, in Montgomery, the 
 
89 Id. at 303, 319, 320 (O’Connor, J., plurality, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J., and 
Kennedy, J.  In a concurring opinion, Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J. in part, stated he 
was “persuaded that the Court should adopt Justice Harlan’s analysis of retroactivity for ha-
beas corpus cases as well for cases still on direct review.”).  While Justice Stevens agrees to 
adopt Justice Harlan’s views, he disagrees with the plurality’s interpretation to the funda-
mental fairness exception. Id. at 320 (Stevens, J., concurring).  “[F]actual innocence is too 
capricious a factor by which to determine if a procedural change is sufficiently ‘bedrock’ or 
watershed’ to justify application of the fundamental fairness exception.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 
322 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
90 Id. at 311 (O’Connor, J., plurality) (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693-94 (Harlan, J., 
concurring)). 
91 Id. at 309 (O’Connor, J., plurality).  “No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial 
system, not society as a whole is benefited by a judgment providing that a man shall tenta-
tively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incarceration 
shall be subject to fresh litigation.” Id. (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 691 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring)). 
92 Id. at 311 (O’Connor, J., plurality) (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693-94 (Harlan, J., 
concurring)) (emphasis omitted). 
93 Teague, 489 U.S. at 307, 319-20 (O’Connor, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J., and Kenne-
dy, J.  In a concurring opinion, Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J. in part, agreed to adopt 
the retroactivity doctrine but rejected the interpretation of the second exception.); See also 
Butler, 494 U.S. at 415-16.  Even though the Court in Teague described substantive rules as 
an exception to retroactive application, the Court has since characterized substantive new 
rules as “not subject to the bar.” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728 (quoting Schriro, 542 U.S. at 
352 n.4). 
94 Moriearty, supra note 4, at 964.  The federal government in its brief explained that pro-
cedure is how “a case is adjudicated” and substantive is “the possible outcomes of the case.” 
10
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Court even described the first exception as “substantive rules of con-
stitutional law.”95  New substantive rules are retroactively applied on 
collateral review because these rules “necessarily carry a significant 
risk that a defendant stands convicted of ‘an act that the law does not 
make criminal;’ or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose 
upon him.”96 
There are several categories of substantive rules.97  First, sub-
stantive rules can alter the conduct criminalized, including changing 
the elements of a statute.98  Second, a substantive rule may “place[] a 
class of private conduct beyond the power of the State to pro-
scribe.”99  Third, a substantive rule prohibits a type of punishment for 
a group of defendants based on the crime or their status.100 
The second exception only applies new rules retroactively 
when the new rule is a “watershed” rule of procedure that undermines 
the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.101  This exception is lim-
ited to new procedures that seriously diminish the certainty of a con-
viction.102  Procedural rules are generally not retroactive because pro-
cedural rules “merely raise the possibility that someone convicted 
with use of the invalidated procedure might have been acquitted oth-
erwise.”103  Procedural rules regulate the manner of determining guilt 
or who is making the decision.104  It is still unclear what rules would 
be classified as watershed for the purposes of this exception because 
the Court has never actually found a rule to be watershed.105 
 
Denniston, Argument Preview, supra note 83. 
95 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728. 
96 Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352. 
97 Moriearty, supra note 4, at 965.  It is important to note that in Montgomery, the Su-
preme Court explained “[s]ubstantive rules include ‘rules forbidding criminal punishment of 
certain primary conduct’ as well as ‘rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a 
class of defendants because of their status or offense.’ ” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728 
(quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 330). 
98 Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353-54. 
99 Saffle, 494 U.S. at 494. 
100 Penry, 492 U.S. at 330. 
101 Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352. 
102 Butler, 494 U.S. at 416 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 312-13 (O’Connor, J., plurality)).  
“[W]e operate from the premise that such procedures would be so central to an accurate de-
termination of innocence or guilt . . . .” Teague, 489 U.S. at 313 (O’Connor, J., plurality). 
103 Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352. 
104 Id. at 353. 
105 Brandon Buskey & Daniel Korobkin, Elevating Substance Over Procedure: The Ret-
roactivity of Miller v. Alabama under Teague v. Lane, 18 CUNY L. REV. 21, 28 (2014). 
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IV. MONTGOMERY HELD THE PROHIBITION ON 
MANDATORY JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 
IS SUBSTANTIVE AND RETROACTIVE 
A. MONTGOMERY’S PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On November 13, 1963, Henry Montgomery, at age 17, 
committed murder.106  He murdered a deputy sheriff in East Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana107 and was sentenced to mandatory life in prison 
without parole following his murder conviction.108  Montgomery’s 
conviction became final on March 15, 1971, 44 years prior to Mil-
ler.109  At the time of Montgomery’s conviction, the courts did not 
consider age and other juvenile traits as a factor for sentencing. 110  
Montgomery is 69 years old now and has been in prison since his 
sentencing.111 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller, Montgom-
ery filed a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, which the District 
Court denied.112  The District Court applied Teague in order to de-
termine if the new rule from Miller should be applied retroactively.113  
The District Court found that in order for a new rule to be applied on 
collateral review, the rule must fall within one of the exceptions es-
 
106 Brief of Respondent State of Louisiana at 11, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 
718 (2016) (No. 14-280) [hereinafter Brief of Respondent]; Wolf, supra note 10. 
107 Denniston, Argument Preview, supra note 83. 
108 Brief of Respondent, supra note 106, at 11.  Montgomery originally received a death 
sentence, but it was overturned and he was sentenced to life without parole instead. Wolf, 
supra note 10. 
109 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455; Brief of Respondent, supra note 106, at 11.  Montgomery’s 
case became final when the Supreme Court of Louisiana refused to change his sentence. 
Denniston, Argument Preview, supra note 83.  In fact, a case is considered “final after the 
first round of lower court review.” Id. 
110 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 85, at 12. 
111 Wolf, supra note 10. 
112 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at App. 1, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 
(2016) (No. 14-280) [hereinafter Petition for Writ]. 
113 Id.  The State Court chose to apply Teague; however the case Danforth v. Minnesota 
held that states do not have to apply Teague. 552 U.S. 264 (2008); Jason M. Zarrow & Wil-
liam H. Milliken, Retroactivity, The Due Process Clause, and the Federal Question in 
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 42, 43 (2015).  In fact, Danforth left it 
unsettled whether states must use the exceptions set forth in Teague in a retroactivity analy-
sis. Zarrow, supra note 113, at 43. 
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tablished in Teague.114  The District Court explained that Miller did 
not fall into either Teague exception because it was neither a categor-
ical bar on a sentence nor a “watershed rule.”115  The court described 
the first Teague exception as new rules that remove a specific pun-
ishment from the available constitutional punishments for a class of 
people.116  The court explained that Miller was not a categorical bar 
on life in prison without parole; it only prohibited a mandatory sen-
tencing scheme.117  Therefore, the Miller holding did not fall under 
the first Teague exception.118  The court then defined the second ex-
ception as “watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the 
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”119  
The court did not explain why the holding in Miller is not a “water-
shed” procedural rule.120  The court only stated Miller did not qualify 
under the second Teague exception.121 
Montgomery then applied to the Louisiana Supreme Court for 
a supervisory and remedial writ, which the court granted.122  The 
Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s denial of the 
Motion to Correct and Illegal Sentence.123  Finally, the United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari on March 23, 2015.124 
B. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION 
In Montgomery, the Supreme Court was asked to determine 
an issue splitting the state courts: whether Miller should be applied 
retroactively to juvenile homicide offenders who were sentenced be-
fore Miller was decided.125  The majority started the opinion with a 
description of the procedural history in Montgomery and then dis-
 
114 Petition for Writ, supra note 112, at App. 1. 
115 Id. at App. 2. 
116 Id. at App. 1. 
117 Id. at App. 2. 
118 Id. 
119 Petition for Writ, supra note 112, at App. 2. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 State v. Montgomery, 141 So. 3d 264, 264 (L.A. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1546 
(Mem) (Mar. 23, 2015) (No. 14-280). 
123 Id. 
124 Montgomery, 135 S. Ct. at 1546. 
125 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 725. 
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cussed the jurisdictional issue before the Court.126  During the juris-
dictional analysis, the Court briefly described the retroactivity law set 
forth in Teague.127 
As discussed earlier, the Court in Montgomery explained that 
there are two instances when a new rule will not be subject to the bar 
on retroactivity: when a new rule is substantive and when a new rule 
is a watershed procedural rule.128  Here, the Court only listed two of 
the categories for substantive exceptions in its analysis.129  Specifical-
ly, the Court referred to “rules forbidding criminal punishment of cer-
tain primary conduct,” and “rules prohibiting a certain category of 
punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or of-
fense.”130  The Court stated that case precedent explained the Consti-
tution requires new substantive rules to be retroactive because sub-
stantive new rules introduce “categorical constitutional guarantees 
that place certain criminal laws and punishments altogether beyond 
the State’s power to impose.”131  Therefore, a state cannot enforce a 
sentence that is deemed unconstitutional.132  The Court further clari-
fied that “the use of flawless sentencing procedures” cannot “immun-
ize[] the defendant from the sentence imposed.”133  A sentence that 
contradicts a substantive rule is void and a court cannot leave a sen-
tence in place that contradicts a substantive rule, regardless of when 
the sentence became final.134  Indeed, the Court further emphasized 
this point by stating, “[a] penalty imposed pursuant to an unconstitu-
tional law is no less void because the prisoner’s sentence became fi-
nal before the law was held unconstitutional.  There is no grandfather 
clause that permits States to enforce punishments the Constitution 
forbids. To conclude otherwise would undercut the Constitution’s 
 
126 Id. at 725-32.  “[T]he jurisdictional question hinged on whether the Court’s retroactivi-
ty precedents are a constitutional mandate.” Miller v. Alabama rule barring mandatory life 
imprisonment without parole for juvenile homicide offenders applied retroactively in state 
cases on collateral review—Supreme Court Decision, 33 No. 4 WEST'S CRIMINAL LAW NEWS 
NL 63 (2016). 
127 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728-30. 
128 Id. at 728; see supra text accompanying notes 85-105. 
129 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728. 
130 Id. (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 302, 330). 
131 Id. at 729. 
132 Id. at 729-30. 
133 Id. at 730. 
134 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at.731. 
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substantive guarantees.”135  Additionally, applying a substantive new 
rule retroactively does not undermine the principle of finality because 
a state cannot preserve a sentence that is unconstitutional.136 
Next, the Court went on to determine if the rule from Miller 
was substantive and, therefore, retroactive.137  The Court reiterated 
that Miller’s decision was founded on precedent that held particular 
punishments disproportionate for juveniles, specifically citing Roper 
and Graham.138  The Court explained that, “[p]rotection against dis-
proportionate punishment is the central substantive guarantee of the 
Eighth Amendment and goes far beyond the manner of determining a 
defendant’s sentence.”139  The Court emphasized the established 
principle that children are different with respect to sentencing and the 
penological justifications for sentencing do not justify juvenile life 
without parole.140 
Even though there may be a “rare juvenile offender who ex-
hibits such irretrievable depravity,” the Montgomery Court repeated 
the notion that juvenile life without parole should be uncommon.141  
Due to this reasoning the Court in Montgomery viewed the Miller 
holding as more than a simple requirement to hear juvenile mitigating 
factors before sentencing.142 
The Court then explained further that simply conducting an 
individualized sentencing hearing would not make a sentence consti-
tutional if the crime was a result of transient immaturity in the juve-
nile.143  In fact, Miller found life without parole an excessive punish-
ment for all juveniles, except for the rare juvenile whose crime 
indicated irreparable corruption.144  In view of this interpretation, the 
Court found Miller “rendered life without parole an unconstitutional 
penalty for ‘a class of defendants because of their status’—that is, ju-
 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 732. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. (explaining Roper prohibited the death penalty for juveniles and Graham prohibited 
juvenile life without parole for non-homicide offenses). 
139 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732-33. 
140 Id. at 733. 
141 Id. at 733-34. 
142 Id. at 734. 
143 Id. (“Even if a court considers a child's age before sentencing him or her to a lifetime 
in prison, that sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects 
‘unfortunate yet transient immaturity.’ ”). 
144 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734. 
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venile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of 
youth.”145  Under this classification, the Miller holding fell squarely 
within the Penry exception for substantive rules, which mandates ret-
roactivity when a type of punishment is prohibited for a group of de-
fendants based on their crime or status.146  The Court clearly feared 
that mandatory life without parole posed too significant a risk that a 
juvenile would receive a sentence that could not be imposed on him 
or her.147  In fact, the Court found the risk so significant as to find the 
“vast majority of juvenile offenders” received a sentence that cannot 
be imposed on them.148 
The Court acknowledged the problematic quote from Miller 
that asserted the decision was not a categorical bar on life without pa-
role for juveniles.149  While Miller did not impose a categorical bar 
for all juveniles, the Court did find the decision barred life without 
parole for any juvenile whose crime did not reflect permanent incor-
rigibility.150  Indeed, the Court interpreted Miller as drawing a line 
between juveniles who are irreparably corrupt and those who were 
experiencing transient immaturity.151  Even though life without parole 
may be the proportionate sentence for those juveniles who are irrepa-
rably corrupt, it “does not mean that all other children imprisoned 
under a disproportionate sentence have not suffered the deprivation 
of a substantive right.”152 
Interestingly, the Court conceded that an individualized hear-
ing to present juvenile age factors “has a procedural component” in 
response to the Miller Court specifically calling it a process.153  How-
ever, a rule that has a procedural component in order to actualize a 
substantive guarantee is not the same as a procedural rule under 
Teague.154  There are circumstances where a substantive rule requires 
 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 734; Penry, 492 U.S. at 330. 
147 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734. 
148 Id. 
149 Id.  “Our decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type 
of crime—as, for example we did in Roper or Graham.  Instead, it mandates only that a sen-
tencer follow a certain process . . . .” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471. 
150 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id.  In Miller, the Court stated its holding was not a categorical bar, but “[i]nstead, it 
mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process . . . .” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471. 
154 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734-35. 
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a procedure in order for a defendant to prove he or she cannot receive 
a particular sentence.155  For instance, “when the Constitution prohib-
its a particular form of punishment for a class of persons, an affected 
prisoner receives a procedure through which he can show that he be-
longs to the protected class.”156  A procedural requirement necessary 
to facilitate a substantive rule does not turn a substantive guarantee 
into a purely procedural rule.157  Here, an individualized sentencing 
hearing does not make Miller procedural, but instead gives effect to 
the substantive guarantee against a disproportionate sentence, particu-
larly life without parole for juveniles experiencing transient immatu-
rity.158 
The Court therefore held that the Miller holding is “a substan-
tive rule of constitutional law.”159  The Court was additionally per-
suaded to hold Miller is a substantive rule considering the fact that 
there is a grave risk that juveniles are unconstitutionally being held 
because the vast majority of juvenile homicide offenders received a 
sentence that was disproportionate to their crime and status.160 
Next, the Court responded to the justifiable concern that ap-
plying Miller retroactively would be a burden on the states.161  The 
Court clarified that applying Miller retroactively does not require re-
sentencing every juvenile offender who has been sentenced to life 
without parole.162  In fact, “[a] State may remedy a Miller violation 
by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for pa-
role, rather than by resentencing them.”163  Allowing juvenile homi-
cide offenders to be eligible for parole protects against a dispropor-
tionate sentence because those juveniles whose crimes were an 
indication of transient immaturity, and who have matured over time, 
will have the chance of freedom.164  Even more, 
[e]xtending parole eligibility to juvenile offenders 
does not impose an onerous burden on the States, nor 
 









164 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736. 
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does it disturb the finality of state convictions.  Those 
prisoners who have shown an inability to reform will 
continue to serve life sentences.  The opportunity for 
release will be afforded to those who demonstrate the 
truth of Miller’s central intuition—that children who 
commit even heinous crimes are capable of change.165 
In the end, the Court explained that prisoners must be granted the op-
portunity to show their crimes were caused by transient immaturity 
and not irreparable corruption.166  While the Court did discuss Mont-
gomery’s mitigating factors that may show his crime was caused by 
transient immaturity, the Court did not make a final decision as to 
whether Montgomery should be released.167  However, it is clear that 
if a juvenile offender’s crime were a result of transient immaturity 
then he or she must have the chance of leaving prison one day.168 
C. JUSTICE SCALIA’S DISSENT 
Justice Scalia169 wrote a dissenting opinion in Montgomery 
and was joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Alito.170  The derisive 
opinion makes several accusations, among them, that the majority 
rewrote Miller, essentially tried to ban life without parole for juve-
niles, and made a “Godfather” like offer to the states to make juvenile 
homicide offenders parole eligible.171 
As noted earlier, the majority described substantive rules as 





168 Id. at 736-37. 
169 Justice Scalia passed away while this comment was being written. Bridget Mire, Lo-
cals remember U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, DAILYCOMET.COM (Feb. 21, 
2016), http://www.dailycomet.com/article/20160221/articles/160229966.  This dissent in 
Montgomery is one of Justice Scalia’s last opinions published. Id. 
170 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 737 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas also wrote a 
dissenting opinion in this case, but it will not be discussed in this comment. Id. at 744. 
171 Id. at 737, 743-44 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  “Justice Scalia wrote a scathing dissent.” 
Andrew Cohen, The Supreme Court May Have Just Granted Thousands of Prisoners a 
Chance of Freedom: The Montgomery Ruling Says Juveniles Sentenced to Life Without Pa-
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and laws “altogether beyond the State’s power to impose.”172  Justice 
Scalia declared that Miller “simply does not decree” that which the 
majority claimed Teague required in order for a rule to be retroac-
tive.173  Justice Scalia then boldly accused the majority of rewriting 
Miller to overcome this obstacle.174 
Justice Scalia strongly opposed the majority’s finding that 
Miller rendered a particular punishment unconstitutional for a certain 
class of defendants.175  In his argument, Justice Scalia relied on a spe-
cific quote from Miller, which stated, “[o]ur decision does not cate-
gorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime—as, 
for example, we did in Roper or Graham. Instead, it mandates only 
that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s 
youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a particular 
penalty.”176  Justice Scalia found the majority’s decision in Mont-
gomery to be a clear contradiction to this explicit statement in Mil-
ler.177 
Justice Scalia also took exception to the majority’s reliance on 
quotes from Miller, which stated juvenile life without parole should 
be uncommon and mandatory sentencing schemes posed a significant 
risk that juveniles will receive a disproportionate sentence.178  In fact, 
Justice Scalia alleged that even if a sentence is “inappropriate and 
disproportionate for certain juvenile[s]” it does not mean a sentence 
is “unconstitutionally void.”179  The support the majority relied on to 
reach its holding actually only shows why the procedure mandated in 
Miller is desirable.180  Despite the majority’s reliance on dicta from 
Miller, Justice Scalia could not move past the fact that Miller affirma-
tively stated the holding was not a categorical bar, but a process.181  
For a second time, Justice Scalia accused the majority of rewriting 
 
172 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729; see supra text accompanying note 131. 
173 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 743 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. (quoting Miller, 132, S. Ct. at 2471). 
177 Id. 
178 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 743. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. (explaining a discretionary sentencing procedure is desirable to deter the imposition 
of a life sentence for some juvenile offenders). 
181 Id. at 743. 
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Miller.182  Specifically stating, “the majority is not applying Miller, 
but rewriting it.”183 
Interestingly, Justice Scalia noted in a footnote that he agreed 
with the majority’s first description of the holding from Miller, spe-
cifically that a juvenile offender could not be sentenced to life with-
out parole absent a hearing on the juvenile age factors.184  In fact, the 
majority initially described the Miller holding as “a juvenile convict-
ed of a homicide offense could not be sentenced to life in prison 
without parole absent consideration of the juvenile’s special circum-
stances . . . .”185  Justice Scalia accused the majority of “softening the 
reader with 3 pages of obfuscating analysis” in order to change its 
original interpretation of the Miller holding.186 
Justice Scalia believed this reinterpretation of the Miller hold-
ing has consequences.187  Particularly, if states are categorically 
barred from sentencing juveniles who are not permanently incorrigi-
ble to life in prison, then the procedure required by Miller may not be 
satisfied even when in place.188  The majority asserted in its opinion 
that the presence of a discretionary hearing does not allow a juvenile 
“whose crime reflects transient immaturity” to receive a life without 
parole sentence because this would still violate the Eighth Amend-
ment.189  Justice Scalia explained that “[i]t remains available for the 
defendant sentenced to life without parole to argue that his crimes did 
not in fact ‘reflect permanent incorrigibility.’ ”190  Now judges are 
left to answer the “knotty ‘legal’ question” of whether a prisoner was 
incorrigible decades ago at the original time of his or her sentenc-
ing.191  Justice Scalia pointed out that Miller required an inquiry into 
whether the juvenile was incorrigible at the time of sentencing, “not 
whether he has proven corrigible and so can safely be paroled to-
day.”192  In fact, Justice Scalia went on to call this imposition on the 
 
182 Id. 
183 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 743. 
184 Id. at 743 n.1. 
185 Id. at 725 (Kennedy, J., opinion). 
186 Id. at 743 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
187 Id. at 743. 
188 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 743. 
189 Id. at 735. 
190 Id. at 743-44. 
191 Id. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
192 Id. 
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states silly and impossible.193 
Despite this new incorrigibility standard the majority imposed 
here, Justice Scalia stated, “[t]he majority does not seriously expect 
state and federal collateral-review tribunals to engage in this silliness, 
probing the evidence of ‘incorrigibility’ that existed decades ago 
when the defendants were sentenced.”194  As mentioned earlier, the 
majority suggested states “remedy a Miller violation by permitting 
juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than 
by resentencing them.”195  Justice Scalia strongly questioned this 
“not-so-subtle invitation” to convert mandatory juvenile life without 
parole sentences to parole eligible sentences.196  In fact, Justice Scalia 
compared the majority to the “Godfather” and called this ‘invitation’ 
to the state legislatures, which would allow state courts to avoid the 
serious burden of resentencing, an “offer they can’t refuse.”197  This 
‘invitation’ by the majority actually led the dissent to believe the en-
tire decision was an attempt to eliminate juvenile life without parole.  
In fact, Justice Scalia asserts, “[t]his whole exercise, this whole dis-
tortion of Miller, is just a devious way of eliminating life without pa-
role for juvenile offenders.”198 
Actually, the dissenting opinion alleged the only reason the 
majority did not affirmatively ban juvenile life without parole in 
Montgomery is to avoid embarrassment.199  Justice Scalia explained 
that, in Roper, the Court justified banning the death penalty for juve-
niles because life without parole was an available and severe punish-
ment.200  Justice Scalia speculated that the only reason the Court did 
not affirmatively ban juvenile life without parole is because Justice 
Kennedy, who wrote both the opinions in Roper and Montgomery, 
would have to contradict the statement that life without parole is a 
 
193 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 736 (Kennedy, J.,); see supra text accompanying note 163. 
196 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
197 Id. at 744. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. (“The Court might have done that [eliminate juvenile life without parole] expressly 
(as we know, the Court can decree anything), but that would have been something of an em-
barrassment.”). 
200 Id.  “[I]t is worth noting that the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibil-
ity of parole is itself a severe sanction, in particular for a young person.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 
572. 
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severe enough alternative to the death penalty.201  Due to this, the 
Court did not affirmatively prohibit the sentence; instead Justice 
Scalia alleged the Court “merely makes imposition of that severe 
sanction a practical impossibility.”202 
V. MONTOMERY REACHED THE CORRECT HOLDING 
FOR THE WRONG REASONS 
Broadly, Miller did create a new procedure.203  In fact, the 
majority agreed there was a procedural element, but still found the 
holding in Miller to be substantive.204  While a ‘process’ for deter-
mining a sentence would be most easily construed as procedural un-
der a Teague analysis, Miller did not slightly alter the existing pro-
cess but initiated an entirely new substantive standard.205  In fact, 
Miller held that state governments could not constitutionally impose 
a specific punishment.206  This substantive change caused many states 
to enact new legislation in order to prevent unjust sentencing among 
juveniles.207  By prohibiting mandatory life in prison without parole, 
many states were forced to change their sentencing laws; they did not 
simply have to change the process for sentencing a juvenile.208 
The majority correctly viewed the individualized sentencing 
hearing as a process necessary to actualize a substantive right.209  In-
deed, the procedural element in Miller that requires a sentencing 
hearing is a direct “result of a substantive change in the law that pro-
 
201 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744. 
202 Id. 
203 State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115 (Iowa 2013). 
204 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734, 736. 
205 Eric Schab, Departing from Teague: Miller v. Alabama’s Invitation to the State to Ex-
periment with New Retroactivity Standards, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 213, 222-23 (2014). 
206 Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: Juvenile Life-Without-Parole Case Means Courts 
Must Look at Mandatory Sentences, A.B.A. J. Law News Now (Aug. 8, 2012, 1:30 PM 
CDT), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky_juvenile_life-without-
parole_case_means_courts_must_look_at_sen/. 
207 Schab, supra note 205, at 222-23. 
208 Buskey & Korobkin, supra note 105, at 33.  When the Supreme Court prohibited man-
datory life sentences for juveniles, it required states to “alter and expand the range of permis-
sible punishments” for juvenile homicide offenders.  Id. at 34 (emphasis omitted).  Further, 
Miller mandated states “offer juveniles at least one sentence carrying the possibility of re-
lease, irrespective of ‘the fairness of the procedures used to implement them,’ the decision is 
firmly in the ‘substantive sphere’ as defined by the Supreme Court.” Id. at 33. 
209 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734-35. 
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hibits mandatory life-without-parole sentencing.”210  Ultimately, Mil-
ler altered the range of available sentencing options for juvenile hom-
icide offenders, and any change, whether it be expanding or narrow-
ing, to the criminal punishment options is certainly “a classic 
function of substantive law.”211 
Actually, a procedure is the only way to ensure juveniles are 
not facing a disproportionate sentence when their crimes stemmed 
from transient immaturity.212  The majority’s decision to extend Mil-
ler retroactively was the correct and fair decision.  Refusal to extend 
Miller retroactively to all juvenile offenders serving a mandatory life 
without parole sentence would be unjust.213  For the juvenile whose 
crime was a result of transient immaturity, “[i]t . . . would be terribly 
unfair to have individuals imprisoned for life without any chance of 
parole based on the accident of the timing of the trial.”214 
As noted earlier, the dissent accused the majority of trying to 
effectively ban juvenile life without parole.215  In fact, Justice Scalia 
proclaimed the entire decision “is just a devious way of eliminating 
life without parole for juvenile offenders.”216  While the majority 
made the correct decision in the end, Justice Scalia is also correct in 
his interpretation of the majority’s motives.  The majority was trying 
to make life without parole for juveniles practically impossible, if not 
eliminate the sentencing option in its entirety. 
As explained earlier, the exceptions to the retroactive bar in-
clude when a new rule prohibits a specific type of punishment for a 
specific class of people.217  The majority found the Miller rule to fall 
within this exception, even though it admittedly did not bar juvenile 
life without parole for all juveniles.218  The Court, however, still 
found the Miller rule to qualify as a Teague exception because “Mil-
ler did bar life without parole, however, for all but the rarest of juve-
nile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibil-
 
210 Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115. 
211 Buskey & Korobkin, supra note 105, at 33. 
212 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735. 
213 Chemerinsky, supra note 206. 
214 State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 508 (Wyo. 2014); Chemerinsky, supra note 206. 
215 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744, (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying 
notes 171, 198. 
216 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744, (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
217 See supra text accompanying note 100. 
218 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734. 
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ity.”219  This classification by the majority is not in line with the actu-
al holding in Miller. 
In fact, Justice Scalia asserted several times that the majority 
rewrote Miller in order to reach its ultimate conclusion, and that is 
indeed what the majority did.220  As Justice Scalia pointed out, the 
majority originally described the Miller holding as a requirement that 
sentencing bodies consider the circumstances of youth.221  Then, only 
a few pages after the Court initially explained the Miller holding, the 
majority stated, “Miller determined that sentencing a child to life 
without parole is excessive for all but ‘the rare juvenile offender 
whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’ ”222  This new descrip-
tion of the Miller holding is utilized by the majority to fit the holding 
nicely into a retroactive application exception.223  The transformed 
holding immediately precedes the majority’s explanation that Miller 
“rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for ‘a class 
of defendants because of their status’—that is, juvenile offenders 
whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth.”224  It does 
appear that the majority was concerned with the outcome of the case 
to the point that it essentially made Miller fit into a Teague exception, 
even if it meant a new interpretation of the Miller holding. 
However, the majority could have reached its conclusion that 
Miller is retroactive without changing the holding in Miller.  Miller 
held that a certain type of punishment, mandatory life without parole, 
could not be imposed on a certain class of people, juveniles.225  The 
Court should have found Miller retroactive based on ‘mandatory life 
without parole’ as the prohibited category of punishment, instead of 
finding it retroactive based on juveniles “whose crimes reflect per-
manent incorrigibility” as a class of defendants.226 
Many state courts held Miller was retroactive, and even did so 
under the same retroactive exception the Court used, without reinter-
 
219 Id. 
220 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).  For instance, Justice Scalia states “the majority simply pro-
ceeds to rewrite Miller” and “[i]t is plain as day that the majority is not applying Miller, but 
rewriting it.” Id. 
221 Id. at 743 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
222 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. 
225 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. 
226 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734. 
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preting Miller.227  Several state courts found the category of punish-
ment to be mandatory life without parole.228  For instance, in Massa-
chusetts the court found, “[t]he rule explicitly forecloses the imposi-
tion of a certain category of punishment—mandatory life in prison 
without the possibility of parole—on a specific class of defendants: 
those individuals under the age of eighteen when they commit the 
crime of murder.”229  Also, in Mississippi, the court held “Miller ex-
plicitly prohibits states from imposing a mandatory sentence of life 
without parole on juveniles.”230 
Clearly, the Court could have found Miller a substantive rule 
within a Teague exception without having to reinterpret Miller.231  In-
stead of holding Miller retroactive based on the original interpretation 
of the holding, the Court rewrote Miller.232  It is clear that the majori-
ty went 
beyond the actual scope of the Miller ruling, by 
strengthening the chance that a newly convicted juve-
nile will be able to show, at the time of sentencing, 
that he is not beyond rehabilitation to become a law-
abiding individual.  Life without parole, the Court de-
clared, is always unconstitutional for a juvenile unless 
he or she is found to be ‘irreparably corrupt’ or ‘per-
manently incorrigible.’233 
Miller originally held Courts must consider a juvenile’s youth status 
before sentencing, which is significantly different from the new 
standard requiring sentencing bodies to determine the incorrigibility 
of a juvenile.234  By rewriting the holding, the Court imposed a new 
 
227 People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (Ill. 2014); Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suf-
folk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 281 (Mass. 2013); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 702 (Miss. 
2013); Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115. 
228 Buskey & Korobkin, supra note 105, at 30. 
229 Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 281. 
230 Jones, 122 So. 3d at 702. 
231 See e.g., Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722; Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 281; Jones, 122 So. 3d at 
702; Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115. 
232 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734, 743-44 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
233 Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Further Limit on Life Sentences for Youthful Crim-
inals, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 25, 2016, 12:26 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01/opinion-analysis-further-limit-on-life-sentences-for-
youthful-criminals/ [hereinafter Denniston, Opinion Analysis]. 
234 Id. 
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difficult incorrigibility standard on sentencing bodies.  This reinter-
pretation of Miller, despite the Court’s ability to apply the decision 
retroactively without rewriting the holding, is intellectually dishonest. 
As the dissent pointed out, Miller intended for a sentencing 
body to determine a juvenile’s incorrigibility at the time of sentenc-
ing.235  Now, a prisoner will need to show he or she is corrigible and 
will not be a threat to the community if paroled.236 
The process of determining a prisoner’s incorrigibility as a 
juvenile, and in some instances these cases will date back decades, 
may prove impossible.237  In fact, Louisiana said resentencing is im-
practical because everyone from the first trial is now dead.238  Fur-
ther, juvenile traits were not recorded at the time of the initial sen-
tencing and would now be impossible to discover.239  Sixteen states, 
fueled by their concern, filed an amicus brief arguing, “resentencing 
would not reflect Miller at all but would effectively become a parole 
hearing.”240 
The majority responded to the justifiable concern that resen-
tencing prisoners will be impossible by suggesting “[a] State may 
remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders 
to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.”241  Es-
sentially, the Court issued an ultimatum to the states to either make 
prisoners who were sentenced to mandatory life without parole as a 
juvenile parole eligible, or begin the impossible process of resentenc-
ing hundreds of prisoners. 
If a state needs to resentence hundreds of prisoners, making 
those prisoners parole eligible may be the only way for a state to 
avoid a significantly onerous burden.242  Notably, allowing juvenile 
homicide offenders to become parole eligible, in place of holding re-
sentencing hearings, can save a substantial amount of money and 
 
235 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
236 Id. 
237 Id. (referencing Brief for National District Attorneys Assn. et al. as Amici Curiae at 9-
17, Montgomery v. Louisiana, No. 14-280, (U.S. Aug. 31, 2015).  In fact, Justice Scalia even 
calls the process of proving a prisoner’s corrigibility silly.  Id. 
238 Wolf, supra note 10. 
239 Brief of Other States, supra note 10, at 9. 
240 Id. at 7. 
241 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736. 
242 Id. at 736. 
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avoid lengthy court proceedings.243  The majority’s ‘suggestion’ that 
state legislatures enact statutes allowing for parole after a juvenile has 
served a specified number of years in prison may be the only option 
for many states.244 
The majority specifically referenced a statute in Wyoming, 
which built in an exception for juvenile homicide offenders allowing 
for parole after serving 25 years in prison.245  Wyoming is not the on-
ly state to legislatively address the issue of retroactivity.  Indeed, sev-
eral other states also reacted to Miller by enacting statutes that al-
lowed for resentencing after a prisoner has served a specific sentence 
length.246  Essentially these statutes require a juvenile homicide of-
fender to have his or her sentence reviewed after a specific term of 
years has passed. 
The chance to avoid burdensome resentencing hearings by 
enacting wide sweeping legislation may be appealing to many 
states.247  However, legislative enactments, similar to Wyoming’s, 
 
243 Liliana Segura, Supreme Court Gives New Hope to Juvenile Lifers, but Will States De-
liver?, THE INTERCEPT (Jan. 26, 2016), https://theintercept.com/2016/01/26/montgomery-v-
louisiana-supreme-court-gives-new-hope-to-juvenile-lifers-will-states-deliver/ (explaining 
the Louisiana Center for Children’s Rights have estimated resentencing hearings will cost $3 
million for defense attorneys in the first year alone). 
244 Id.; Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736. 
245 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-10-301 (c) (2013).  “A person 
sentenced to life imprisonment for an offense committed before the person reached the age 
of eighteen (18) years shall be eligible for parole after commutation of his sentence to a term 
of years or after having served twenty-five (25) years of incarceration . . . .” § 6-10-301 (c). 
246 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (d)(2)(A)(i) (2016) (“When a defendant who was 
under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the defendant 
was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has served at least 
15 years of that sentence, the defendant may submit to the sentencing court a petition for re-
call and resentencing.”); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 11, § 4204A (d)(1)(2) (2013) (“[A]ny offender 
sentenced to a term of incarceration for murder first degree when said offense was commit-
ted prior to the offender's eighteenth birthday shall be eligible to petition the Superior Court 
for sentence modification after the offender has served 30 years of the originally imposed 
Level V sentence.”). 
247 Cristian Farias, Justice Scalia Calls Out a Colleague for Flip-Flopping on Juvenile 
Justice, HUFFPOST POLITICS (Jan. 28, 2016, 5:03 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/scalia-kennedy-juvenile-
justice_us_56a8ea1fe4b0947efb661ba7 (“Sending all those lifers to the parole board sounds 
much easier than trying to conduct proper re-sentencing hearings in so many old cases.”).  
After Miller was decided, several states enacted statutes limiting a juvenile’s sentence by 
creating the option for parole or resentencing after a specified sentence length. E.g., CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 1170 (d)(2)(A)(i) (2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-10-301 (c) (2013); DEL. 
CODE ANN. TIT. 11, § 4204A (d)(1)(2) (2013).  It is reasonable to expect several more states 
will enact similar statutes now that Montgomery has been decided.  Following Montgomery, 
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would have the same effect as if juvenile life without parole was 
eliminated in its entirety.248  By issuing an ultimatum to the states to 
enact this type of legislation, the Court clearly preferred juvenile 
homicide offenders be eligible for parole and not serve life without 
parole sentences. 249  Even though the Court did not affirmatively 
eliminate juvenile life without parole, the Court clearly tried.250  It es-
sentially told the states to start the onerous burden of resentencing 
hundreds of prisoners or eliminate juvenile life without parole.251 
Justice Scalia is correct that the Court had a “devious” plan to 
eliminate life without parole for juveniles.252  Justice Kennedy, who 
wrote the majority opinion in Montgomery, is the leading proponent 
for leniency in juvenile sentencing.253  In fact, Justice Kennedy con-
sistently chips away at juvenile sentencing laws, finding harsh pun-
ishments disproportionate and unconstitutional for anyone under 18 
years old.254  Clearly, Justice Kennedy’s views on juvenile sentencing 
played a crucial role in this decision.255  However, while there was 
 
several states have proposed legislation to change their sentencing laws for juvenile homi-
cide offenders. See, e.g., H.B. 405, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2016)(adopted Mar. 25, 
2016); H.B 2390, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016); S.B. 1147, 200th Gen. As-
semb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2016). 
248 Notably, the proposed legislation created in the wake of Montgomery effectively elim-
inates life without parole for anyone under 18 years old. See, e.g., H.B 2390, 98th Gen. As-
semb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016) (proposing the elimination of life without parole for juve-
niles); H.B. 405, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2016)(adopted March 25, 2016) (proposing the 
elimination life without parole for juveniles, which was signed by the Governor on Mar. 25, 
2016); S.B. 1147, 200th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2016) (proposing the elimination of 
life without parole for juveniles and creating a maximum sentence of 45 years or 35 years 
depending on the age of the juvenile). 
249 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736, 744 (Kennedy, J., opinion)(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
250 Id. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
251 Id. at 736, 744 (Kennedy, J., opinion)(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
252 Id. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
253 Adam Liptak, Justices Expand Parole Rights for Juveniles Sentenced to Life for Mur-
der, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/us/politics/justices-
expand-parole-rights-for-juveniles-sentenced-to-life-for-murder.html?_r=0. 
254 Tamar Birckhead, Will Supreme Court Decision be Death Knell for Life Without Pa-
role, JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION EXCHANGE (Jan. 26, 2016), http://jjie.org/will-
supreme-court-decision-be-death-knell-for-life-without-parole/179709/.  In fact, Justice 
Kennedy also wrote the majority opinion in both Roper and Graham. Roper, 543 U.S. at 
554; Graham, 560 U.S. at 51. 
255 See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 82 (holding juvenile life without parole for nonhomi-
cide offenders is unconstitutional); Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (holding the death penalty is un-
constitutional for juveniles).  Justice Kennedy clearly believes juveniles can be rehabilitated 
and is committed to protecting juveniles in the court system. Tamar R. Birckhead, Graham v. 
Florida: Justice Kennedy's Vision of Childhood and the Role of Judges, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. 
28
Touro Law Review, Vol. 32 [2016], No. 3, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss3/8
2016 MONTGOMERY V. LOUISIANA 707 
 
hope, and even encouragement, that the Supreme Court would hold 
life without parole unconstitutional, the Court did not affirmatively 
ban the punishment.256  Instead of affirmatively finding juvenile life 
without parole unconstitutional, the Court rewrote the Miller holding 
to make the sentence a practical impossibility.257 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In sum, the awaited decision in Montgomery held Miller is a 
substantive rule and must be applied retroactively.258  The Court ex-
tended its juvenile sentencing cases, much to the antipathy of Justice 
Scalia.259  In fact, the majority interpreted Miller as prohibiting life 
without parole for juveniles whose crimes reflect transient immaturi-
ty, which is not consistent with the Court’s initial interpretation of the 
holding.260  This decision was beyond the scope of what Miller actu-
ally held.261  This change in the Miller holding introduced a new 
standard on state sentencing bodies.262  Now, sentencing bodies must 
assess the juvenile’s incorrigibility, which is a difficult standard for 
courts to determine.263  Justice Kennedy was clearly swayed by his 
strong dislike of harsh punishments for juvenile offenders.264  It is 
clear the majority had a specific outcome in mind when it wrote the 
opinion, and reached its conclusion by essentially rewriting its hold-
ing in Miller. 
 
& PUB. POL’Y 66, 69-70 (2010).  Over the last several years, the Court has issued decisions 
that called for more lenient juvenile sentencing laws, thanks in part to Justice Kennedy, who 
wrote Roper and Graham. Fred Lucas, Going Soft on Juvenile Crime: How the MacArthur 
and Casey Foundations Distort Youth Offender Policies, CAPITAL RESEARCH CENTER (May 
2013) https://capitalresearch.org/2013/05/going-soft-on-juvenile-crime-how-the-macarthur-
and-casey-foundations-distort-youth-offender-policies/. 
256 Brief of the Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice and The Criminal 
Justice Institute as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 2, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 
136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (No. 14-280). 
257 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 743-44 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
258 Id. at 732. 
259 Matt Ford, A Retroactive Break for Juvenile Offenders, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 26, 2016), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/montgomery-alabama-supreme-
court/426897/; see supra text accompanying note 171. 
260 See supra text accompanying notes 185-86. 
261 Denniston, Opinion Analysis, supra note 233. 
262 Id. 
263 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
264 See supra text accompanying notes 246-47. 
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The Supreme Court’s decision grants thousands of juvenile 
homicide offenders the opportunity to have their sentences reheard 
and even a possible chance at freedom.265  Due to the large number of 
prisoners this decision affects, and the possible burden it will impose 
on the states, the Court gave the states an alternative option to resen-
tencing every prisoner.266  In fact, the majority issued an ultimatum to 
the states: either judicially resentence every juvenile homicide of-
fender or legislatively convert the sentence to parole eligible.267  
Again, it is clear the majority disfavored juvenile life without parole 
and would prefer if states eliminated the sentence in its entirety. 
Even though the Court conducted an intellectually dishonest 
analysis by rewriting Miller in order to hold the decision retroactive, 
in the end, the Court made the correct decision.  Thousands of pris-
oners who have been serving a mandatory life without parole sen-
tence will receive the chance to have his or her sentence reviewed.  It 
would be unjust to have over 2,000 people serve a sentence that, to-
day, is unconstitutional.  As the majority pointedly stated, “[t]here is 
no grandfather clause that permits States to enforce punishments the 
Constitution forbids,”268 and there should not be. 
 
 
265 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736; Transcript supra note 10, at 35, 38. 
266 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736. 
267 Id. 
268 Id. at 731. 
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